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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH (WVC),
APPELLANT'S BRIEF ON
APPEAL

Plaintiff/Respondent,
vs.

Case No. 980197-CA
Third District Court
Case Nos. 971000887
971000888
971000889

RANDY PATTEN,
Defendant/Petitioner.

For purposes of this brief individual documents contained
within the record will be referred to as "(R.
the

docket

as

"(Doc.

) " , references

to

) " , references to

the partial

hearing

transcript of the testimony of Susan Patten on June 23, 1997 as
11

(Tr.

)" and the transcript of the trial judge's ruling ordering

a mistrial on June 23, 1997 will be referred to as "(J.R.

)".

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This

is

an

interlocutory

appeal

from

the

Third

District

Court? s denial of Defendantf s Motion to Dismiss on Double Jeopardy
and

Improper

Termination

Grounds

(R.

169, 170) by

Memorandum

Decision, March 18, 1998 (R. 41-43; 87-89; 172-174) with respect to

the trial court's prior Order Of Mistrial of October 2, 1997 (R.
67, 68).
Defendant' s Petition for Interlocutory Appeal pursuant to Rule
5, Utah R. App. P., was filed April 6, 1998 and granted by this
Court? s Order Granting

Petition For Permission to Appeal

from

Interlocutory Order on or about May 12, 1998.
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this matter pursuant
to § 78-2a-3(2)(d), U.C.A., as amended.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
I.

DID THE DECLARATION OF MISTRIAL CONSTITUTE JEOPARDY?

The first question presented by this appeal is whether the
trial court's declaration of mistrial was based upon circumstances
not amounting to "absolute" or "manifest" necessity, thus invoking
the

protection

of

the

double

jeopardy

clauses

of

the

Fifth

Amendment, United States Constitution and Art. I, Sec. 14, Utah
State Constitution, thereby barring retrial of the defendant.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The standard of review with respect to a trial court's ruling
on a mistrial is whether the trial court abused its discretion.
State v. Castle, 951 P.2d 1109 (Ut. App. 1998).
PRESERVATION OF ISSUES IN TRIAL COURT
The trial court declared a mistrial in open court on or about
June 23, 1997.

(Tr. Judge's Ruling, 2-5)

A formal Order of

Mistrial was entered on or about October 2, 1997. (R. 67, 68). On
or about November 4, 1997 defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss on
Double Jeopardy and Improper Termination Grounds. (R. 169, 170)

©

The trial court denied this motion by Memorandum Decision on or
about March 18, 1998.
II.

(R. 41-43; 87-89; 172-174)

DID THE DECLARATION OF MISTRIAL AMOUNT TO AN IMPROPER
TERMINATION?

The second question presented by this appeal is whether the
trial court's declaration of mistrial was an "improper termination"
pursuant to § 76-1-403, U.C.A., as amended, thus barring retrial of
the accused.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Statutory interpretation is a question of law which the Court
of Appeals reviews for correctness, granting no deference to the
trial courtf s determinations.

Bellonio v. Salt Lake City Corp.,

911 P.2d 1294, 1296 (Utah App. 1996).
PRESERVATION OF ISSUES IN TRIAL COURT
The trial court declared a mistrial in open court on or about
June 23, 1997.

(Tr. Judge's Ruling, 2-5)

A formal Order of

Mistrial was entered on or about October 2, 1997. (R. 67, 68). On
or about November 4, 1997 defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss on
Double Jeopardy and Improper Termination Grounds. (R. 169, 170)
The trial court denied this motion by Memorandum Decision on or
about March 18, 1998.

(R. 41-43; 87-89; 172-174)

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES
Constitutional provisions of central importance to this appeal
are the double jeopardy provisions of both the Utah State and
federal constitutions, set forth in pertinent part as follows:
... nor shall any person be subject for the same offense
to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb....

Amendment V, United States Constitution.
... nor shall any person be twice be put in jeopardy for
the same offense.
Article I, §12, Constitution of Utah.
A statute central to this appeal is § 76-1-403, U.C.A., as
amended,

entitled

"Former

Prosecution

Barring

Prosecution For Offense Out Of Same Episode."

Subsequent

A copy of § 76-1-

403, U.C.A. is set forth in its entirety in the Appendix.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Defendant was charged under § 76-5-108, U.C.A., alleging
violation of a protective order, a class A misdemeanors, by three
separate Informations filed on or about February 28, 1997 (cases
#971000887, #971000888, #971tfOt9).

The trial court consolidated

the three Informations for all purposes including trial.
17-97)

Defendant entered pleas of not guilty.

(Doc. 3-

(Doc. 3-4-97)

A bench trial was conducted, the Honorable Ronald Nehring,
Judge presiding, on or about the 23rd of June, 1997.
97)

Witnesses

prosecution.

were

sworn

(Doc. 6-23-97)

the court declared a mistrial.

and

testified

on

(Doc. 6-23-

behalf

of

the

Prior to the City resting its case,
(Doc. 6-23-97)

The trial court's

formal Order of Mistrial was made and entered October 2, 1997.

(R.

67, 68).
On or about November 3, 1997, defendant filed Motions to
Dismiss on Double Jeopardy and Improper Termination Grounds with
supporting memorandum.

(R. 169; 139-152)

The City responded on

November 21, 1997 with its Objection to Motion to Dismiss.

Q

(R. 69-

78) The defendant replied with a Response to Plaintiff's Objection
to Motion to Dismiss, January 22, 1998.

(R. 79-86)

Oral argument was entertained on January 26, 1998 (Doc. 1-2698) and on or about March 18, 1998, Judge Judith S. H. Atherton,
denied the Defendant's motions by Memorandum Decision (R. 41-43;
87-89; 172-174).
The defendant petitioned this court for permission to take an
appeal from that interlocutory order, April 6, 1998, which was
granted, May
Athertonfs

12, 1998.

interlocutory

This is an appeal
Order

of

March

from
18,

Judge
1998,

Judith
denying

Defendant's Motions to Dismiss.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The defendant was charged by three Informations, each filed on
or about February 28, 1997 with violation of a protective order in
a domestic case pursuant to Title 77, Chapter 36 (R. 1, 2, 45, 46,
115,

116), cases

respectively.

number

971000887,

971000888,

and

971000889

Roger Sandack entered his appearance representing

the defendant (R. 15), the matters were consolidated for trial
(Doc. 3-17-97) and the defendant entered pleas of not guilty (Doc.
3-4-97).
A number of witnesses were called in the consolidated cases at
the bench trial conducted on June 23, 1997, the Honorable Ronald
Nehring, Judge presiding (Doc. 6-23-97).

However, the particular

set of facts which ostensibly led to the declaration of mistrial
are limited to the examination of one particular witness, the
alleged victim, defendant's wife, Susan Patten (Tr. June 23, 1997).

Mrs. Patten testified on direct examination with respect to various
incidents, the particular details of which are unimportant to this
appeal, occurring on the dates alleged in the Informations (Tr. p.
2-20).
Cross-examination was conducted by Mr. Sandack (Tr. p. 20-45).
At a point in time Mr. Sandack commenced a series of questions
attempting to seek information with respect to certain written
statements that Mrs. Patten may have made in conjunction with the
complaints (Informations) that were filed against Mr. Patten.

The

following exchange thereupon took place:2
ATTORNEY 1: The practices [sic]
I think what she is
referring to is that she made complaints to the police
officers and that's why she's saying
she filed
complaints. She's had no contact with me or anyone in
the Prosecutor's Office. She may have had contact with
a victim's (unintelligible).
Right.
MS. PATTEN
Who did you have contact with?
ATTORNEY 2
Cindy.
MS. PATTEN
Is Cindy in the Courtroom today?
ATTORNEY 2
Yes.
MS. PATTEN
She's personally (unintelligible)?
ATTORNEY 2
Yes.
MS. PATTEN
What's her name?
ATTORNEY 2
Cindy.
MS. PATTEN
Cindy what?
ATTORNEY 2
I have no idea.
MS. PATTEN
And
how many times have you had
ATTORNEY 2
conversation with her?
MS. PATTEN:
Maybe four.
ATTORNEY 2:
When were those conversations?
MS. PATTEN:
I don't recall.
ATTORNEY 2:
You also had conversations with your
counsel, did you not, about these same allegations?
MS. PATTEN:
My Counsel?
ATTORNEY 2:
Your attorneys.
MS. PATTEN:
Yes. Attorney for

2
"ATTORNEY 1" is Keith Stoney, West Valley City Prosecutor,
and Mr. Sandack is "ATTORNEY 2."
6

ATTORNEY 2:
Your attorney • And did she advise
you with respect to the filing of these charges?
MS- PATTEN
Yes.
ATTORNEY 2
Her name is Laurie Hubert?
MS. PATTEN
Yes.
ATTORNEY 2
Is she married to John Hubert?
MS- PATTEN
I believe so.
ATTORNEY 2
John Hubert of the
MS. PATTEN
I don't know her husband.
ATTORNEY 2
West Valley City Prosecutorf s Office?
MS. PATTEN
I believe so.
ATTORNEY 2
Do you have any knowledge as to
whether or not she had discussions with Mr. John Hubert?
Not that I'm aware of.
MS. PATTEN:
Your Honor, I'm a bit concerned here.
ATTORNEY 1:
when she was represented by
Could we find our [sic]
Laurie Hubert?
She is my divorce attorney.
MS. PATTEN:
I know, but when did you see Ms.
ATTORNEY 1:
Hubert?
When did I see her?
MS. PATTEN:
Yes.
ATTORNEY 1:
The day I went to Court last week.
MS. PATTEN:
Well, you were represented by her
JUDGE NEHRING:
earlier than that, weren't you?
ATTORNEY 1:
Maybe Counsel knows. Can somebody
just give me a date as to when she appeared as counsel?
MS. PATTEN:
She appeared as counsel
ATTORNEY 2:
Let me ask you this.
Your own
attorney, Joy (inaudible).
She's not my attorney.
MS. PATTEN:
She was your attorney.
ATTORNEY 2:
Yes.
MS. PATTEN:
And she moved for leave to withdraw
ATTORNEY 2:
on February 25, 1997. Is that correct?
Correct.
MS. PATTEN:
Did you hire Laurie Hubert at or
ATTORNEY 2:
about the same time as Joy (inaudible)?
MS. PATTEN:
Yes, I did.
ATTORNEY 2:
And how were you introduced to Laurie
Hubert, if I can ask?
MS. PATTEN:
I was just given her name.
ATTORNEY 2:
By whom?
MS. PATTEN:
I believe Cindy gave it to me.
ATTORNEY 2:
By Cindy?
MS. PATTEN:
Uh-huh.
JUDGE NEHRING Could you approach (unintelligible)
ATTORNEY 2:
I think we better,
[whispered conversation]
JUDGE NEHRING: We'll be in recess for ten.
(Tr. 42 - 45)

7

After the recess court reconvened and Judge Nehring made the
following statement which constitutes the bench ruling and brief
discussion which occurred with counsel:
JUDGE NEHRING:
Back on the record.
West Valley
City vs. Patten. It has been clear on the record that
Ms. Patten retained Ms. Huber as her counsel, and that
her husband, John Huber, is the assistants'prosecutor for
West Valley City. I have learned from Mr. Stoney that
the date that Ms. Huber was retained by Ms. Patten was
after the date of filing these cases.
However, the
relationship between Ms. Patten, Ms. Huber and Mr. Huber,
is such that irrespective of the date the attorney-client
relationship was formed, it raises questions of
impropriety that rise to the level in my mind to warrant
mistrial which I am now granting.
I want to say that
there is no direct evidence of impropriety, and that I am
extremely confident that there was none.
However,
vigorous advocacy of the kind that I have come to expect
from Mr. Sandack, could in my view, lead to requests to
explore the relationship, if any, between Mr. Huber and
Ms. Huber and this case. And that kind of enterprise in
my view would be contrary to the interests of justice,
and the interests of justice here is having this case
tried on the merits as expeditiously as possible. And
accordingly in addition to granting a mistrial, based on
the court's own motion, I am going to reassign this case.
I am going to reassign this case because I have
participated in discussions with possible resolution of
the case.
I know considerable amount about this case
beyond what I've heard from the witnesses and beyond
whatf s on the record on the case. And in my view my
continued
involvement
on
this
case
would
be
inappropriate. Unless there are questions from counsel.
SANDACK:
Your Honor, I'd like the court to note
that, while I take it as a compliment that my advocacy
may result in that, that I haven't made any requests.
JUDGE: No you absolutely have not. I raise that
only as a specter of something that might be appropriate
if we were to continue, but that's certainly true that
you haven't suggested it.
STONEY: I would like to take benefit of the record
for just a moment.
JUDGE:

Absolutely.

8

STfcNEY: Alright, we would like to make clear that
the court is not ordering that there is a conflict with
the prosecutor's office at this point in time. Is the
court stating that?
JUBN3E:

I am not.

ST0NEY:
As well I would like it clear that the
reason that the court is ordering a mistrial is because
of the appearance of a potential problem.
JUDGE:
Correct.
There is an appearance of
impropriety, there is no direct evidence of conflict of
interest.
STtJJEY:
And may the court also note that the
prosecution has objection to that, to the court's order?
And I'll leave with that, that we don't believe that that
is the remedy that should be sought given what the court
has found at this point in time.
JUfGE:
Well, then I'm just going to go into a
little more detail about. . . .
STONEY:
And then I'm going to respect what the
court says. I just wanted the objection on the record.
JUDGE: And it's noted, and my concern, just so it's
on the record is this, that the prospect of possible
conversations with attempts to manipulate prosecution of
a criminal case in order to advance a client's interest
in a civil case is so distasteful a piece of conduct, but
it' s still something that this relationship suggests
might be available, and it's because of that possibility,
that appearance, that I've made this ruling. And I'll
close again by saying there's no direct evidence that
that has happened. Thanks for your patience. We'll be
in recess.
(J.R.

2-5)

Subsequently

after

some jockeying

back

and

forth

between

counsel as to what language the formal order should contain, the
trial court entered its written order of mistrial on October 2,
1997 (R. 67, 68).
On November 3, 1997, defendant filed Motions to Dismiss on
double jeopardy and improper termination grounds with supporting a
9

memorandum.

(R. 169; 139-152)

The City responded on November 21,

1997 with its 1 Objection to Motion to Dismiss.

(R. 69-78)

The

defendant replied with a Response to Plaintiff's Objection
Motion to Dismiss on January 22, 1998.

to

(R. 79-86)

On January 26, 1998 Judge Judith S. H. Atherton heard oral
argument

(Doc.

1-26-98)

and

on

March

18,

1998

denied

the

Defendant's motion by Memorandum Decision (R. 41-43; 87-89; 172174).
Judge Atherton declined in her decision to address the issue
of whether or not there was a "manifest necessity" for declaring a
mistrial on the basis stated by Judge Nehring from the bench or
contained within his formal order of mistrial, but rather indicated
that Judge Nehring had a "clear and compelling basis" for declaring
a mistrial under U.C.A.

76-1-403(4)(c)(iii)(Supp.

1997),

i.e.,

"prejudicial conduct in or out of the courtroom not attributable to
the state, making it impossible to proceed with trial without
injustice to the defendant or state".
the

order

of

mistrial

does

not

She reasoned that "although

address

the

judge's

findings

concerning his recusal, those findings on the record support the
order of mistrial."

Thus Judge Atherton denied the defendant's

motion to dismiss on statutory grounds.

(R. 87-89).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1.

Double jeopardy bars retrial.

There was no manifest necessity underlying the declaration of
mistrial, the defendant did not consent thereto, thus retrial and
reprosecution would violate the double jeopardy clauses of the
10

Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article One,
Section 1 2 , Utah State Constitution.
uJTs
2.
There was jwimproper
termination.
The trial court f s declaration of mistrial took place before
the verdict, for reasons not amounting to an acquittal, after the
first witness was sworn, under circumstances where the defendant
did not consent to the termination, did not waive his right to
object to the termination, and there were no other factors making
it statutorily improper or illegal to proceed, thus constituting an
improper termination barring retrial of the defendant pursuant to
§ 76-1-403, U.C.A., as amended.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
PRINCIPALS OF DOUBLE JEOPARDY BAR RETRIAL OF
THIS MATTER AND MANDATE DISMISSAL.
The first question which should be addressed is whether the
defendant's jeopardy rights attached to the proceedings below.
This issue usually arises in the context of a jury trial;

jeopardy

attaches once "a jury has been sworn and empaneled."

State v.

Nilson, 854 P. 2d 1029, 1031 (Utah App. 1993) citing

State v.

Ambrose, 598 P. 2d 354, 358 (Utah 1979).

The rule applicable to the

case at bar is that a defendant in a bench trial is placed in
jeopardy once the first witness is sworn.

State v. Byrns, 911 P. 2d

981,984 (Utah App. 1995).
In

either

situation* both

Constitutions guarantee

the

United

States

and

Utah

"that no person shall be twice put in

jeopardy for the same offense."

State v. Nilson, at 1031 citing
11

State v. Parson, 818 P.2d 581, 584 (Utah App. 1981).

Witnesses had

been sworn and testimony elicited in the trial court below.

Hence

double jeopardy protection is applicable to the proceedings.
The double jeopardy provisions of the Utah State Constitution,
Article I, §12, and the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution
are in substance identical.

The double jeopardy provision of the

Fifth Amendment was made directly applicable to the states by the
United States Supreme Court in Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 89
S.Ct. 256, 23 L.Ed.2d 707 (1969).

Moreover it is apparent that the

courts of the State of Utah have traditionally adopted standards
consistent with the federal courts in analyzing the sort of double
jeopardy question presented in this case.

See generally State v.

Ambrose, supra.
The general rule as it arises in the context of mistrial was
enunciated in State v. Ambrose as follows:
Utah law also establishes that discharge of the jury
without a verdict operates as an acquittal unless (1) the
defendant consents to the discharge or (2) "legal
necessity" requires the discharge in the interest of
justice.
Ambrose at 358.
The "concept of legal necessity" has been variously expressed
as

"special

necessity."

necessity,"

"absolute

necessity,"

or

"manifest

Ambrose at 358, quoting from United States v. Perez,

22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579, 6 L.Ed. 165 (1824)(in which the United
State Supreme Court enunciated the original "manifest necessity"
standard, stating that the power to order a mistrial should be

12

"used with the greatest caution, under urgent circumstances, and
for very plain and obvious causes",

22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 580).

The federal trial courts are now guided by Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 26.3, Mistrial (adopted 1993), which states as
follows:
Before ordering a mistrial, the court
opportunity for the government and for
comment on the propriety of the order,
each party consents or objects to a
suggest any alternatives.

shall provide an
each defendant to
including whether
mistrial, and to

The substantive law regarding mistrials was not changed by
Rule 26.3, however it has been stated that federal practice under
the rule "does require an elevated awareness of the substantive law
in relation to the competing interest of the parties."
Federal Practice, 3rd Ed., Mistrial § 626.3.06.

Mooref s

It therefor is of

some benefit in analyzing the case at hand.
The basis of Judge Nehring's declaration of mistrial was not
that the court found direct evidence of impropriety.

The court

stated that it was "extremely confident that there was, in fact,
none."

(J.R. 2)

The court explicitly indicated that "it is not

stating that there is a conflict, per se, in or with the West
Valley City office and this case." (J.R. 4)
If in fact there were a conflict in the West Valley City
office, which the court did not find, then declaring a mistrial and
ordering

that the case be prosecuted

by some other agency or

attorney independent of the West Valley City office would have been
not only an appropriate course of action for the court to take but
an essential one.
13

Declaring a mistrial, but not disqualifying the West Valley
City prosecutor from the case, explicitly announcing that there was
not in fact a conflict, but only an appearance of impropriety (J.R.
2, 3 ) , then reassigning the case for trial before another judge
without in any way addressing the likelihood that precisely the
same scenario might arise again, only perpetuated the perceived
problem.
The fact that the alleged victim had retained an attorney who
is the wife of an assistance West Valley City prosecutor, and that
the attorney was retained at the behest of the victim witness
counselor for West Valley City remains an unalterable fact of the
case.

The mistrial remedied nothing in that respect.

If the West

Valley City prosecutor were to present evidence again, the same
appearance of impropriety would exist, and counsel for the defense
would

have

at

least

some

ability

to

exploit

the

questioned

relationship again.
The trial judge has the authority and is responsible
administering

justice.

The

trial

judge

is

"responsible

for
for

carrying [the trial] forward as efficiently and expeditiously as
possible consistent with fairness and thoroughness in administering
justice."

Hanks v. Christensen, 354 P.2d 564, 566 (Utah 1960).

That did not happen in this case.
for the abortive result.

There was no manifest necessity

Consequently, these cases should be

dismissed.
The double jeopardy clause protects an individual not
simply from subjection to more than one punishment, but
from being twice put to trial for the same offense. The
guaranty assures that, with certain exceptions, an
14

individual will not be forced to endure the strain,
embarrassment, anxiety and expense of a criminal trial.
State v. Ambrose, 598 P.2d 354, 357 (Utah 1979).
Ambrose involved somewhat similar factual circumstances.
There the trial court sua sponte declared a mistrial and discharged
the jury upon the basis of certain untoward comments made by the
prosecutor while jurors were being questioned with respect to the
likelihood that a verdict would be reached.
found the mistrial to be unnecessary.

The Supreme Court

The defendant argued that

certain statements made to the jury by the prosecutor after the
state had rested but during the course of the jury's deliberations
were made in bad faith in an effort to motivate the defendant to
move for a mistrial which would allow the state to retry the case.
The

Court

agreed

that

the

remarks

of

the

prosecutor

were

unnecessary and improper but did not agree that they were initiated
out of a bad faith desire to provoke a request for a mistrial.
Ambrose at 357.
Neither the trial court nor the defendant in this situation
believes West Valley City prosecutor Keith Stoney acted in bad
faith.

Whether there was bad faith between Mrs. Huber, the divorce

lawyer, and the West Valley City assistant prosecutor, Mr. Huber,
is to say the least beyond the record.

In any event Judge Nehring

specifically found that there was no such evidence, but only the
appearance of impropriety.

Courts must refrain from prematurely

declaring a mistrial unless it determines "after careful inquiry"
that it is "the only reasonable alternative to insure justice under
the circumstances."

Ambrose at 358.
15

These circumstances are somewhat analogous to United States v.
Jorn. 400 U.S. 480, 91 S.Ct. 547, 27 L.Ed.2d

543 (1971).

The

Supreme Court in Jorn held that the trial judge, one Judge Willis
Ritter, in the United States District

Court for the District of

Utah, who on his own motion declared a mistrial to enable the
government's witnesses to consult with their own attorneys, abused
his discretion in discharging the jury, thus barring reprosecution
of the defendant.

The standard of review regarding mistrials in

the federal courts is the same as that in the state of Utah, i.e.,
abuse of discretion.

U.S. v. Jorn, supra, 91 S.Ct. at 558, 400

U.S. at 487; State v. Castle, supra, 951 P.2d at 1111.
Jorn stands for the proposition that while a motion by the
defendant for mistrial is ordinarily assumed to remove any barrier
to reprosecution, even if the defendant's motion is necessitated by
prosecutorial or judicial error, in the absence of such a motion
the manifest necessity doctrine,
[S]tands as a command to trial judges not to foreclose
the defendant's option until a scrupulous exercise of
judicial discretion leads to the conclusion that the ends
of public justice would not be served by a continuation
of the proceedings.
U.S. v. Jorn, citing U.S. v. Perez, (9 Wheat.) 579, 580,
6 L.Ed. 165 (1824).
The Jorn court summed up the dilemma as follows:
The conscious refusal of this Court to channel the
exercise of that discretion according to rules based on
categories of circumstances, see Wade v. Hunder# 336,
U.S., at 691, 69 S. Ct., at 838, reflects the elusive
nature of the problem presented by judicial action
foreclosing the defendant from going to his jury. But
that discretion must still be exercised; unquestionably
an important factor to be considered is the need to hold
litigants on both sides to standards of responsible
16

professional conduct in the clash of an adversary
criminal process. Yet we cannot evolve rules based on
the source of the particular problem giving rise to a
question whether a mistrial should or should not be
declared, because, even in circumstances where the
problem reflects error on the part of one counsel or the
other, the trial judge must still take care to assure
himself that the situation warrants action on his part
foreclosing the defendant from a potentially favorable
judgment by the tribunal.
U.S. v. Jorn, 91 S.Ct. at 557, 400 U.S. at 486.
The court in Jorn described circumstances wherein it would
have to be said that Judge Ritter acted with greater abruptness
than did Judge Nehring at the case at hand.

Nonetheless the

situation is analogous and the ultimate holding is compelling to
the facts of this case.

The Supreme Court stated:

It is apparent from the record that no consideration was
given to the possibility of a trial continuance; indeed,
the trial judge acted so abruptly in discharging the jury
that, had the prosecutor been disposed to suggest a
continuance, or the defendant to object to the discharge
of the jury, there would have been no opportunity to do
so. When one examines the circumstances surrounding the
discharge of this jury, it seems abundantly apparent that
the trial judge made no effort to exercise a sound
discretion to assure that, taking all the circumstances
into account, there was a manifest necessity for the sua
sponte declaration of this mistrial. United States v.
Perez, 9 Wheat, at 580. Therefore we must conclude that
in
the
circumstances
of
this
case
appellee's
reprosecution would violate the double jeopardy provision
of the Fifth Amendment.
It has been said that a trial court should focus on at least
four considerations in determining whether to order a mistrial:
(1) The opinions of the parties about the propriety
of the mistrial;
(2) The alternatives to a mistrial, including those
least harmful to a defendant's rights;
(3) Placing deliberations concerning the motion on
the record; and
(4) Whether the defendant would benefit from the
declaration of mistrial.
17

Mooref s Federal Practice, 3rd Ed., § 626,3.04, Factors
Courts Should Consider in Determining Whether to Order
Mistrial.
By taking these factors into consideration the trial court can
increase the probability that mistrial will be entered only when
there is a manifest necessity to do so.
If there is a manifest necessity for a mistrial, retrial and
reprosecution do not violate the Fifth Amendment.

Illinois v.

Sommerville, 410 U.S. 458, 471, 93 S.Ct. 1066, 35 L.Ed.2d
(1973).
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On the other hand the double jeopardy clause bars a

defendant's retrial when the defendant objects or does not consent
to mistrial and an appellate court subsequently finds the trial
court abused its discretion in so declaring.

U.S. v. Jorn, 400

U.S. at 481.
A defendant may waive a double jeopardy defense if he consents
to a mistrial.

However the record must reflect that the defendant

was given an adequate opportunity to state a position or suggest
alternatives to a mistrial.
950 F.2d

1236, 1240

consequences

See for example, Glover v. McMackin,

(6th Car. 1991)("In

attached

to

a

finding

light of the drastic

of

consent,

we

reject

respondent's position that the failure of the petitioner to object
on the record constitutes consent").
We cannot know what the result would have been had the trial
court given the state and the defendant an opportunity to discuss
the relative merits of the impending order of mistrial, which
appears to have come as a surprise to both.
would

have

been

to

inquire

affirmatively

©

The better practice
as

to

each

party's

position.

Further it may have been advisable for the trial court

to defer an order of mistrial to allow the parties time to consider
alternatives

and

to

formulate

their

comments

for the

record.

Finally there should have been a methodical evaluation of the
considerations, particularly those which are unfortunately not on
the record having to do with what the judge said he knew about the
case, including how he came to acquire this knowledge, which may or
may not have warranted assignment to another judge, before deciding
whether

to

order

a

mistrial.

In

this

case

none

appropriate considerations and deliberations occurred.

of

these

The court

simply announced a mistrial.
Defense

counsel

did

not

consent

to

this.

Although

the

defendant's counsel did not explicitly object, there was no implied
consent to a mistrial.

As the court in Ambrose, supra, stated,

lf

[w]e will not presume that mere silence in this situation can be

equated

to waiver of such an important constitutional right."

Ambrose, 598 P.2d 361, citing Curry v. Superior Court of the City
and County of San Francisco, (citation omitted), as follows:
When a trial court proposes to discharge a jury without
a legal necessity therefor, the defendant is under no
duty to object in order to claim the protection of the
constitutional guaranty, and mere silence in the face of
an ensuing discharge cannot be deemed a waiver.
Utah State Supreme Court went on to say,
Additionally, the record clearly indicates the court
acted so abruptly in discharging the jury that defendant
counsel had no opportunity to object.
The double
jeopardy protection is not so ephemeral that it vanishes
if an accused does not anticipate and object to every
unexpected action on the part of the court.
Ambrose at 360-361.
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A more recent case, State v. Nilson, supra,

specifically

affirms the language in Ambrose that "failure to object or silence
should

not

be

construed

as

implied

consent

to

a

mistrial,

particularly when the trial court acts abruptly and there is no
opportunity to object."

The Nilson court further approved the rule

in

58 Utah

State v.

Thompson,

291, 199

P.

161, 165

(1921),

previously cited by defendant, wherein even though,
[T]he statements of counsel did not unequivocally
constitute consent to termination, the Supreme Court
found
that
double
jeopardy
barred
a
subsequent
prosecution for the same offense, noting: "upon the whole
record, as made at the investigation, we cannot say as a
matter of law that defendant consented to the order
declaring a mistrial and discharging the jury."
Nilson at 1032.
In

Nilson

the

defendant

specifically

stated

objection to the [state's] motion to dismiss."

"I

have

no

Nonetheless the

Utah Supreme Court stated "We, however, concur with the trial court
that the retrial of Nilson is impermissible."

Nilson at 1032. The

court stated:
Given the dialogue about a probable directed verdict, the
rapidity of the proceedings, and lack of argument by the
State
that
the
circumstances
constituted
"legal
necessity" for declaration of a mistrial, we find
Nilson f s response was inadequate to constitute consent.
Id. at 1032.
The proceedings involving Judge Nehring's ruling

reflect that

both Mr. Stoney and Mr. Sandack were "surprised" by the court's
sudden declaration of a mistrial.

The record does not support that

there was any prior discussion with respect to the mistrial ruling
itself and in the absence of any further testimony or evidence, to
require that there be an affirmative objection, or to construe Mr.
20

Sandack? s obviously unpremeditated remarks as consenting to the
order would be patently unfair.
The record more accurately seems to portray Mr. Sandack as
being caught flat footed in his statement to the court, "Your
Honor, Ifd like the court to note that, . . . that I haven ! t made
any request."
Nehring

at

This is not the language of consent.

any

time

indicate

that

objection

Nor did judge

would

have

been

anything but futile and meaningless. See Glover v McMackin, supra,
950 F.2d at 1239 (6th Car. 1991).
The circumstances here are analogous to those presented by
Nilson; Ambrose; Jorn; McMackin; et al.

There is nothing in the

record which rises to the level of consent. Certainly, as to these
matters of constitutional gravity there is no evidence that the
defendant knowingly and intelligently consented or waived his right
to object.

See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 58 S.Ct. 1019

(1938).
In

this

case none

of

the

appropriate

considerations

and

deliberations occurred, there was no "manifest necessity," and the
defendant

did

not

consent

to

the

mistrial.

Retrial

and

reprosecution are barred by the principles of double jeopardy.
POINT II
RE-TRIAL IS BARRED BY AN IMPROPER TERMINATION
There is little in the case law to distinguish § 76-1-403,
U.C.A.,

as amended, 1974, entitled

Subsequent Prosecution

"Former Prosecution Barring

for Offense Out of Same Episode," from

settled principles of double jeopardy under the state and federal
21

constitutions. It "appears to codify the double jeopardy guarantee
and its exceptions."

State v. Nilson, supra, 854 P.2d at 1031.

Under § 76-1-403, U.C.A., a prosecution is barred by a former
prosecution
resulted

if

in

terminated

by

the

former

conviction,
a

final

prosecution
was

resulted

improperly

order

or

in

acquittal,

terminated,

judgment

for

the

or

was

defendant

necessarily requiring a determination inconsistent with a fact that
must

be

established

prosecution.

to

secure

conviction

in

a

subsequent

Section 76-l-403(1)(1).

There was an improper termination in this case pursuant to §
76-l-403(d) (3) (iii), and subsequent prosecution is therefor barred.
A

termination

is

improper

if

it

takes

place

before

the

verdict, is for reasons not amounting to an acquittal, and if the
jury is waived, after the first witness is sworn.

Section 76-1-

403(4), U.C.A.
In this case the prosecution of defendant took place before
the verdict.

It did not amount to an acquittal.

after the first witness was sworn.

It took place

Presumptively the termination

was improper.
Sub-section (4) of § 76-1-403 goes on to state circumstances
under which termination of prosecution would *&&&- be improper,
specifically if (a) the defendant consents to the termination; or
(b) the defendant waives his right to object to the termination; or
(c) the court finds and states for the record that the termination
is necessary because (i) it is physically impossible to proceed
with the trial in conformity with the law or (ii) there is a legal
22

defect in the proceeding not attributable to the state that would
make any judgment entered upon a verdict reversible as a matter of
law or (iii) prejudicial conduct in and out of the courtroom not
attributable to the state makes it impossible to proceed with the
T

trial without injustice to the defendant or the state; or (4) the
jury is unable to agree on a verdict or (5) false statements of a
juror on voir dire prevent a fair trial.
Judge Atherton ruled that there existed "clear and compelling"
evidence supporting the proposition that there was "prejudicial
conduct in and out of the courtroom not attributable to the state
making it impossible to proceed with the trial without injustice to
the defendant or the state,"

This is not supported by the record.

If it is so, what was the conduct?

The record is devoid of any but

the trial judge's sort of secondary consideration that he knew
quite a bit about the case from settlement discussions.

He did not

ask counsel if they felt he could not be fair, and there is nothing
of record even in general terms to indicate why such action would
be necessary.
The Supreme Court ruled in Ambrose, supra, that since the
trial court's findings were deficient ". . . w e have no basis from
which to conclude whether the court engaged in the scrupulous
exercise of judicial discretion required when dealing with the
important rights here involved."

Id. at 360.

It appears that

Judge Nehring gave some thought to the declaration of mistrial, but
as

to

the

reasons

Judge

Atherton

assigned

for

denying

the

defendant's motion to dismiss, there is no basis to conclude that
23

"the

court

engaged

in

discretion required.11

the

scrupulous

exercise

of

judicial

Judges often hear and discuss matters off

the record with counsel and the parties.

That does not perforce

require recusal and mistrial.
Judge Nehring did not say whether he had learned a lot about
the case by purposefully
discussions,
discussions

or

somehow

between

interjecting

himself

accidentally

counsel.

If

a

into

became

trial

settlement

embroiled

judge

is

going

in
to

knowingly participate or otherwise allow himself to get pulled into
settlement discussions, he must let counsel know prior thereto that
the result may be a mistrial, giving counsel the opportunity to
decide whether to consent or object.

To wait, participate in

discussions, and then declare a mistrial based

upon

knowledge

gained from the discussions, takes away counsel's opportunity to
consent or object at the point in time it would be meaningful.
The record does not disclose the nature of discussions or how
it came to be that Judge Nehring involved himself, but it puts
trial counsel in a very awkward position if the judge voluntarily
involves himself in settlement discussions.

At what point should

counsel say, "Judge I object to your further participation"?

By

this time it may already be too late.
One possible construction is that Judge Nehring may have felt
that the trial was going to be aborted

anyway because of the

impropriety he had perceived during examination of Mrs. Patten, so
why not see if he could settle the case by involving himself in
settlement discussions?

This must of necessity be speculation but
24

it makes some sense.

If this was the case, he should have made it

known before participating, that he was going to mistry the case.
Since the record

is devoid

of the actual discussions

or

circumstances, it cannot be said there is a "clear and compelling
basis" for declaring a mistrial.

But even if there were, inquiry

would still have to be made into whether there was a good cause for
the judge to put or allow himself to get into a position in which
he knew or should have known a mistrial might be the result without
first allowing counsel to consent or object.
Additionally, § 76-1-403, U.C.A., provides that reprosecution
is proper if:
(c) The court finds and states for the record that the
termination is necessary because:
...

(iii) Prejudicial conduct in or out of the courtroom not
attributable to the state makes it impossible to proceed
with the trial without injustice to the defendant or the
state.
See, State v. Castle, supra, at 1112. ("[l]n entering its
order of mistrial, the court should have more closely tracked the
statutory
statement.

language.")

Judge Nehring made no

such

finding

or

His comment that he knew "a considerable amount" about

the case does not satisfy this provision.

Thus reprosecution is

not allowable.
The defendant did not consent to the termination.

Although

the defendant did not in so many words object to the termination he
certainly did not waive his right to object to the termination
inasmuch as he was never asked and there is no evidence of a
knowing and intelligent waiver on the record.

25

Johnson v. Zerbst,

supra.

There was no consent to the termination and the defendant

did not waive his right to object thereto.
Given all the circumstances, the same arguments previously
raised under the double jeopardy standard, can be reiterated here.
There simply was no good reason to declare a mistrial.

There was

an improper termination, the defendant did not consent, and any
attempted subsequent prosecution is therefor be barred.
CONCLUSION
Judge Athertonfs Order denying the defendant's motion to
dismiss should be reversed.

s~\ .

DATED this J/(jP day of /£^^^^^T^998.

BULLEN
for Defendant/Petitioner
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the ^rtf

day of October, 1998, I

cause 2 true and exact copies of the foregoing document to be
mailed via the US Postal Service, first class postage prepaid, to
the following:
J. Richard Catten
Attorney for Plaintiff/Respondent
3600 South Constitution Blvd.
West Valley City, Utah 85119
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APPENDIX "A"
SECTION 76-1-403, U.C.A.

ui ST 1 76-1-403, Former prosecution barring subsequent prosecution
for offense out of same episode

Utah Code §76-1-403

WESTS UTAH CODE
TITLE 76. CRIMINAL CODE
CHAPTER 1. GENERAL
PROVISIONS
PART 4. MULTIPLE
PROSECUTIONS AND DOUBLE
JEOPARDY
Current through End of 1996 General and 2nd
Special Sessions

§ 76-1-403. Former prosecution barring
subsequent prosecution for offense out
of same episode
(1) If a defendant has been prosecuted for one or
more offenses arising out of a single criminal
episode, a subsequent prosecution for the same or
a different offense arising out of the same criminal
episode is barred if:
(a) The subsequent prosecution is for an offense
that was or should have been tried under section
76-1-402(2) in the former prosecution; and
(b) The former prosecution:
(i) Resulted in acquittal; or
(ii) Resulted in conviction; or
(iii) Was improperly terminated; or
(iv) Was terminated by afinalorder or judgment
for the defendant that has not been reversed, set
aside, or vacated and that necessarily required a
determination inconsistent with a fact that musl be
established to secure conviction in the subsequent
prosecution.
(2) There is an acquittal if the prosecution
resulted in a finding of not guilty by the trier of
facts or in a determination that there was
insufficient evidence to warrant conviction. A
finding of guilty of a lesser included offense is an

Page 1

acquittal of the greater offense even though the
conviction for the lesser included offense is
subsequently reversed, set aside, or vacated.
(3) There is a conviction if the prosecution
resulted in a judgment of guilt that has not been
reversed, set aside, or vacated; a verdict of guilty
that has not been reversed, set aside, or vacated
and that is capable of supporting a judgment: or a
plea of guilty accepted by the court.
(4) There is an improper termination of
prosecution if the termination takes place before
the verdict, is for reasons not amounting to an
acquittal, and takes place after a jury has been
impanelled and sworn to try the defendant, or. if
the jury trial is waived, after the first witness is
sworn. However, termination of prosecution is
not improper if:
(a) The defendant consents to the termination;
or
(b) The defendant waives his right to object to
the termination;
(c) The court finds and states for the record that
the termination is necessary because:
*22002 (i) It is physically impossible to proceed
with the trial in conformity with the law; or
(ii) There is a legal defect in the proceeding not
attributable to the state that would make any
judgment entered upon a verdict reversible as a
matter of law; or
(iii) Prejudicial conduct in or out of the
courtroom not attributable to the state makes it
impossible to proceed with the trial without
injustice to the defendant or the state; or
(iv) The jury is unable to agree upon a verdict;
or
(v) False statements of a juror on voir dire
prevent a fair trial.
As last amended by Chapter 32, Laws of Utah 1974.
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APPENDIX "B"
ORDER OF MISTRIAL

Keith L. Stoney, Bar No. 3868
WEST VALLEY CITY PROSECUTOR
3600 S. Constitution Blvd.
West Valley City, Utah 84119
(801)963-3331

IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, WEST VALLEY DEPARTMENT
STATE OF UTAH (WVC),
ORDER OF MISTRIAL
Plaintiff,
-vsCase No. 971000887

RANDY PATTEN,

Judge Ronald E. Nehring

Defendant.

The above captioned matter came before this Court for trial on June 23, 1997. Defendant
was present with counsel, Roger Sandack and Plaintiff was represented by Keith L. Stoney, West
Valley City Prosecuting Attorney.
FACTS
Plaintiff called witness and adduced evidence during the course of the trial. During the
course of trial, testimony disclosed that the alleged victim had retained private counsel to act on
her behalf in various divorce proceedings. The victim's private counsel is the wife of a West
Valley Assistant Prosecutor. The taking of evidence ceased at that point.
CONCLUSION
While there is no direct evidence of impropriety and the Court is extremely confident that

i
iwrrnN

MISTRIAL ORDER

there was, in fact, none. The Court finds that the mere possibility of conversations between the
Assistant Prosecutor and his wife, the victim's private attorney, suggests an appearance of
impropriety such that the Court, sua sponte, on its own motion and against the prosecutions
objection, declares a mistrial. The Court further notes that it is not stating that there is a conflict,
per se, in or with the West Valley City office and this case.
ORDER
The Court declares a mistrial with respect to the trial of the above matter.
DATED this ^

day of^eptembet, 1997.
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APPENDIX "C"
MEMORANDUM DECISION

IN THE.THIRD DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, WEST VAT.LEY DEPARTMENT

WEST VALLEY CITY,
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Plaintiff,
:
:

CASE NO. 971000887MC
971000888MC
971000889MC

vs.
RANDY PATTEN,
Defendant.

JUDGE JUDITH S H ATHERTON
:

This matter came for hearing on defendant's Motion to Dismiss. West Valley City
was represented by Keith Stoney, defendant by Herschel BuUen. Defendant argues that the
court improperly terminated the trial, and therefore, subjected defendant to double jeopardy.
The court found that there was an appearance of impropriety "based on the possibility
of conversation between the Assistant Prosecutor and his wife, the victim's private attorney"
See Order of Mistrial, p.2. That issue was introduced to the court by way of defendant's
cross examination of the victim. The court recessed and spoke with attorneys in his
chambers. Upon return to the courtroom, the court found that defendant's line of
questioning could "lead to requests to explore the relationship, if any, between Mr. Huber
[the assistant prosecutor] and Mrs. Huber fhis wife] and this case [,] [a]nd that kind of

vt>

enterprise would be contrary to the interests of justice". Transcript.a at —.
In addition, the judge reassigned the case on it's own motion because of having
participated in discussions concerning a plea settlement, finding that he knew a "considerable
amount about this case beyond what... [he'd] heard from the witnesses and beyond what ...
[was] on the record on this case". IJL The basis of the judge's reassignment of the case to
another judge is a clear and compelling basis for declaring a mistrial under U.C.A. 76-1403(4)(c)(iii) (Supp. 1997), "[prejudicial conduct in or out of the courtroom not attributable
to the state, mak[ing] it impossible to proceed with trial without injustice to the defendant or
state". The judge, having heard pertinent information concerning the pending case outside of
the formal court proceeding, acted properly to pr*ysrve defendant's right to a fair trial.
Although the Order of Mistrial does not address the judge's findings concerning his
recusal, those findings on the record support the order of mistrial. As such, this court need
not address other arguments.
Therefore, defendant's motion is denied.
DATED this 18th day of March, 1998.

GE JUDITH S H ATHERTON
*£» •_. .

,y

MAILING CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Memorandum
Decision to Herschel Bullen, Attorney for Defendant, 39 Exchange Place, Suite 200, Stock
and Mining Exchange Bldg, SLC UT 84111 and to Keith Stoney, West Valley City
Prosecutor, 3600 Constitution Blvd. WVC UT 84119.
DATED this 18th day of March, 1998.

